lessons from the data of the l97Os, while Taylor accepted the task of surmiarizing lessons from the theoretical developments of the l970s. Based on what they did, one might infer that for Meyer-Rasche, the l970s represent no more than ten years of additional data. They Neil Wallace is Professor of Economics at the University of Minnesota and Advisor, Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
-103-use those data and earlier data in the same way that most economists ten years ago used the data available to them. In particular, both their so-called structural models and their reduced-form models consist of regression equations that in form are the same as those most economists used in the l960s. Moreover, Meyer-Rasche extrapolate from those regression equations for the effects of different policies in the same way that many economists in the l960s extrapolated from their estimates.
That is why I say that for Meyer-Rasche, the 197Os seem to represent no more than ten years of additional data.
Even at the level of pure empiricism, a different lesson can be drawn. The Meyer-Rasche extrapolation procedure applied in the late 1960s did badly predicting the l970s. Why, then, believe that those same procedures applied now will do well predicting the l980s?
Happily, though, we do not have to decide on the basis of pure empiricism. The theoretical developments of the l97Os --many of which are described in Taylor's paper --provide convincing arguments why we should not take seriously as "multipliers" the correlation coefficients or the functions of them presented in the Meyer-Rasche paper.
Meyer-Rasche are aware of the criticism of the multiplier interpretation of their estimates. In effect, they acknowledge the criticism and say that they are unwilling to defend such an interpretation. In the 1960s, many economists thought that their policy extrapolations from the kinds of models used by Meyer-Rasche were legitimized by existing theory. The theoretical developments of the 1970s have convinced many of us that that is not so. Although Taylor's paper describes some of those developments, his paper stops short of describing in full generality why we were led astray badly by the kind of theorizing that was used. Since that kind of theorizing still persists, it is worthwhile summarizing in a general way what is wrong with Whether we are talking about most textbooks in macroeconomics or most macroeconometric models, the models from which policy implications are drawn consist of a set of relationships --a consumption function, an investment function, a money demand function, and so on. Let us label these M 1 , M 2 , M 3 MN (M for model). The style of macroeconomics textbooks is to present the complete model and its policy implications and also to present separate chapters --one on consumption, one on investment, one on money demand, and so on --that are meant to justify one by one the relationships of the complete model, the M~.
When builders of macroeconometric models try to justify their models, they also proceed in this way. and M~implies that we are missing many of the implications of the underlying theory by limiting attention to the M~. Thus, for example, the Si often contain at least hints of a welfare analysis of inflation.
As is well known, the typical M~provide no such analysis.
I will now briefly defend the nonequivalence claim and, at the same time, argue that inconsistencies are present in standard macro models. And, since this is St. Louis, I will begin by focusing on money demand.
The usual way to defend the money demand functions of most macroeconomic models is to appeal to a transaction cost model of the Baumol -106-(1952), Tobin (1956 ), or Miller-Orr (1966 In the 1970s, of course, inconsistencies regarding expectation formation have received the most attention. Expectation formation is important because macroeconomics is concerned primarily with aspects of behavior that depend upon views about the future --asset acquisition -107-versus current consumption, the composition of assets, or nominal wage determination in those contracts that Taylor discusses at length in his paper. It has been argued convincingly that the M~of most macroeconomic models contain, either implicitly or explicitly, forecasting schemes that are good schemes in some environments and not in others.
(See, for example, Lucas 1976J Moreover, careful examination of the reveals that the particular forecasting schemes imbedded in the were chosen because they were good schemes in particular environments.
The inconsistency arises because the environment implied by all the --including various specifications for policy --may not correspond at all to that assumed in the various This kind of inconsistency is avoided by using a perfect foresight (rational expectations) equilibrium concept. By using that concept, the economist avoids imposing on the individuals whose behavior is being modeled any fixed way of extrapolating from the past, and ensures that he or she is not attributin~to them views about the future that make no sense for the environment they are in. Now having said that perfect foresight is an equilibrium concept, it should be evident that it is misleading to discuss its merits or its implications in terms of a particular policy conclusion like policy (whatever that means) does not matter." The perfect foresight equilibrium concept has been around for a long time. It would be surprising, indeed, if that concept alone implied a result like "policy doesn't matter.' In general, of course, by themselves equilibrium concepts imply very little. The importance of the perfect foresight equilibrium concept has nothing to do with the validity of some vague conclusion -108-like "policy does not matter." Why, then, all the attention to "policy doesn't matter" in this morning's papers?
In 1975, there appeared a paper by Tom Sargent and me in which a result of that sort was obtained. We took a particular M 1 , M 2 MN.
one that we argued resembled in many respects standard macro models, and replaced a fixed forecasting scheme, one of the M~, by perfect foresight. We argued that the replacement made a great difference for the implications of the model. In particular, under perfect foresight and certain other assumptions, all policies in a certain class gave rise to the same equilibrium values for real variables. This result did not follow under the fixed forecasting scheme. Our message was, therefore, that the kind of forecasting scheme imposed matters greatly.
Such a message, though, is very different from one that says that the perfect foresight version should be taken seriously as a model of this or any other economy. From the discussion above --and from remarks in our 1975 paper --it should be evident that the imposition of a perfect foresight equilibrium concept does not by itself turn a hodgepodge of indefensible relationships into a coherent model.
The Sargent-Wallace "policy-doesn't-matter" result is to be contrasted with a neutrality result obtained by Lucas (1972 :ontrast, seek consensus. Since the economics profession is far from iaving reached consensus on macroeconomic policy, I do not envy the ;ask of policymakers in the l980s. The absence of professional conensus leaves policymakers in the position of having to make up their n minds.
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